Is the spread of liberalism creating a fundamentally more peaceful, prosperous, and cooperative inter-American system? The Americas have clearly experienced more cooperation and less conflict over the past ten to fifteen years than before, but there is no consensus over why this has been the case. Liberal scholars of international relations argue that the combination of democracy, liberal norms, free trade, and strengthened international institutions is transforming the inter-American system. Critics of the liberal peace argument suggest that enduring US hegemony, deepening economic dependence, and/or the weakness of liberal institutions play stronger roles in shaping regional politics than does the spread of liberal institutions, norms and economic policies.

All three of the presenters for the panel on integration and security agree that the spread of liberalism is changing inter-American relations in generally positive ways, but that the foundations of this new liberal regional order are still fragile and incomplete. All three agree that a fundamental weakness in this nascent liberal pacific union is the lack of strong regional institutions to manage security relations. All three also agree that the United States is a crucial actor for building these institutions, but that it may also present the most significant obstacle to the creation of effective regional security institutions. All three see linkages between economic integration and security cooperation, but probably underestimate the possibilities that discontent with neoliberal economics could undermine security cooperation. Finally, each of these essays exhibits a strongly prescriptive bent. Each of these presenters would like to build a more peaceful and cooperative liberal regional order and this perspective shapes their analysis in important ways. My comments will address each of these themes.

Joseph Nuņez and Francisco Rojas see more evidence of the liberal character of the inter-American system than does Paulo de Mesquita. In "A 21st Century Security Architecture for the Americas: Multilateral Cooperation, Liberal Peace, and Soft Power," Nuņez assumes that an FTAA will be signed by 2005, that democracy will endure in the region and that these two forces will probably sustain Latin America's status as a "zone of peace" (Nuņez, pp. 2-3). In "Further Interdependence, Greater Demands on Security," Rojas sees a basic regional consensus around principles of democracy, free trade, human rights and the non-violent resolution of disputes (Rojas, p. 2-3). Following Keohane and Nye, he also sees increasing complex interdependence in the region, especially in the economic realm, as a central force driving the states to cooperate more fully on a wide range of issues (Rojas, pp. 11-12). In "Crime, Violence and Democracy in Latin America," Paulo de Mesquita focuses on the increasing violence within Latin American societies and questions whether the extrajudicial repression with which states routinely greet this criminal violence disqualifies them as liberal democracies (de Mesquita, pp. 5-6). Can there be an international liberal peace when states do not obey the rule of law within their own borders?

While de Mesquita most strongly emphasizes the limitations of Latin America's liberalism, Nuņez and Rojas also agree that the foundations of the regional liberal peace are weak. Rojas worries that while presidents have signed thousands of agreements calling for enhanced cooperation, only a small fraction of those agreements have been fully implemented (Rojas, pp. 5-6). The structural heterogeneity of the region makes it difficult for states to realize all the potential gains they might achieve through mutual cooperation. Rojas worries especially about the weakly institutionalized character of regional security arrangements (Rojas, pp. 14-16). Nuņez shares this concern and argues for a more robust security role for the OAS and the creation of mutlinational special forces units as necessary to deepen the ties of security cooperation in the region (Nuņez, pp. 31-36). De Mesquita also sees stronger international institutions and transnational cooperation as necessary to address problems of internal crime and repressive state responses to that crime (de Mesquita, pp. 7-10).

All three also see the US as a necessary, but potentially problematic partner in building a new liberal security architecture for the Americas. Rojas sees the US as an essential leader of the efforts to strengthen regional security institutions, but argues strongly that such institutions must be multilateral if they are to be successful (Rojas, p. 3). US unilateralism will be counterproductive for the creation of a more liberal regional order. De Mesquita goes further, suggesting that there are two international projects relating to fighting internal criminal violence; a US-backed regional project that involves increasing militarization of law enforcement in the region, and a project backed by an international network of non-governmental organizations and civil society advocating more humane, community-based policing models (de Mesquita, pp. 6-10). De Mesquita is a strong advocate for the second project and sees the US as an obstacle to building the kind of regional institutions necessary to establish truly liberal systems of law enforcement and justice in the Americas (de Mesquita, pp. 7-8).

Nuņez addresses the role of the United States most directly and argues that the US must be the central player in the construction of a new security architecture for the region. He argues that the US must exercise strategic restraint, use its "soft power," and act as a hegemonic leader of a community of liberal states, not as a traditional dominant power, if it hopes to overcome the suspicions of its neighbors (Nuņez, pp. 4-5). Nuņez's paper, however, illustrates the difficulty in encouraging the US to treat its neighbors as equal partners and in encouraging Latin Americans to perceive the US as treating them with appropriate respect. Nuņez is trying to convince US foreign and defense policy analysts and policy-makers of the utility of a new cooperative security architecture. Therefore, he spends a considerable amount of time trying to convince this audience that the armed forces of Canada and Latin America are worthy partners in a new regional security architecture.

Much of this discussion tends to classify militaries as more or less "progressive" depending on how closely they cooperate with the US and UN. Thus, Argentina gets high marks for its participation in numerous UN peacekeeping missions (Nuņez, pp. 25-29) and Princess Patricia's Light Brigade of Canada is lauded for its performance in Afghanistan (Nuņez, p. 14). Those who have long been suspicious of deepening security ties with the US are dismissed in the Mexican case as "poorly informed nationalists" spreading "bizarre" stories (Nuņez, pp.19-20). Nuņez suggests that Mexico's armed forces, which have been the most reluctant to build bonds with the US military, are the "least progressive" in the hemisphere (Nuņez, p. 15). Critics of the human rights policies of the Colombian Armed Forces and US support for those armed forces are dismissed as "parrot[ing]" the wrong-headed perspectives of human rights organizations (Nuņez, p. 5, fn. 7). Nuņez's kind words for the "pro-democracy movement" against President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela are bound to be interpreted in a different light after the subsequent coup attempt in that country (Nuņez, p. 3). Even if the US played very little role in the coup attempt, the history of US intervention in the region will lead many to interpret the Bush administration's expression of support for the short-lived interim government in Venezuela in the most negative light possible.

Finally, one of Nuņez's central recommendations for a new security architecture for the Americas is the creation of new joint multinational special forces that could be dispatched by a consensus of the OAS to engage in a variety of missions. Nothing could demonstrate the US's commitment to partnership with its South American allies more than a commitment to place some US troops under the command of officers from other countries in the region for at least some purposes. Nuņez's understandable reluctance to advocate this reflects the certain opposition to such plans within the US (Nuņez pp. 35-36). Nuņez's prescriptions for US participation in a liberal collective security pact for the Americas go further than the proposals of many representatives of the US defense establishment. Nevertheless, they also reflect how difficult it will continue to be for the US to act as an equal partner and for others to accept even the most benevolent policies of the US as evidence of its commitment to genuine partnership.

If US hegemony is one potential barrier to the construction of a liberal pacific union in the Americas, the negative impacts of neoliberal economic policies for many in the Americas presents another potential stumbling block. All three presenters, but especially Rojas, understand that there is an important link between economic interdependence and security cooperation. Nuņez does not see this linkage as problematic, given his assumption that an FTAA will be approved by 2005 and that this will serve as an important foundation for security cooperation (Nuņez, p. 2). Rojas views economic interdependence as a crucial force driving security cooperation, but recognizes that the structural heterogeneity of the region's states makes it difficult for states to move from interdependence to integration (Rojas, pp. 8,11). De Mesquita is most skeptical of the link between neoliberal economics and regional peace and cooperation, given that at some proportion of the increasing crime in the region can be tied directly to the increasing poverty in the region's cities that has been generated by neoliberal reforms (de Mesquita, pp. 3-5). None of the presenters on this panel, however, go as far as Ken Roberts from the final panel in recognizing that even if free trade and neoliberal economic reforms provide greater aggregate growth than alternative policies, the benefits of that growth are often distributed inequitably. Coalitions of the dispossessed could put a halt to the deepening economic integration of the region, thus threatening one of the central pillars of a liberal regional order. Roberts makes a strong argument that popular support for free trade and associated economic reforms is quite weak throughout the region and is poorly institutionalized almost everywhere. All three presenters probably underestimate this threat to a liberal regional order.

Each of the presenters sees some evidence that liberalism is reshaping regional relations. All would like to see these liberal dynamics strengthened and deepened. Indeed, it was often difficult to discern the precise boundaries between analysis and prescription in these papers. This reflects an implicit commitment of each presenter to some kind of constructivist perspective on politics. In essence, they argue that the inter-American system is what we make of it. It can become a more peaceful and cooperative region or revert to older patterns. The future of the region may reflect the outcome of a normative debate about the appropriate path to be taken as much as rational calculations of material interests. In keeping with debates within the constructivist camp, each presenter emphasizes a different potential source of deepening norms of liberal cooperation for the region. Nuņez sees the region's liberal hegemon as the principal source of these liberal norms (Nuņez, p. 4). Rojas sees the liberal democratic governments of Latin America, working through international governmental institutions, as the primary source of liberal norms (Rojas, p. 11). De Mesquita looks to civil society and transnational networks of non-governmental organizations as the primary sources of liberal norms (de Mesquita, pp. 8-10). Actors at each of these levels will probably need to reinforce one another to build a stronger, deeper, and more durable liberal pacific union in the Americas.