Abstract: The paper focuses attention on the rise of crime and violence in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, the implications of this problem for economic and social development, democratic consolidation and regional integration, and the growth of international collaboration in addressing the problem.

In the years following the transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, crime and violence have become major problems in Latin America. Several studies indicated the existence of an epidemic in the region. Apart from the humanitarian dimensions, the rise in crime and violence has imposed significant social costs and has made much more difficult the processes of economic and social development, democratic consolidation and regional integration in the Americas.

Policy and academic debates have focused on two main problems:

1. Organized crime, particularly drug trafficking and terrorism
2. Common crime, particularly violent crime and more specifically homicide.

While the two problems are equally important and inter-related, this paper focuses attention the problem of common crime and international efforts to solve the problem or at least contain the epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s.

The first part analyzes the rise of crime and violence in Latin America. The second part focuses on the implications of the rise in crime and violence for economic and social development, democratic consolidation and regional integration. The third part analyzes the efforts of international collaboration in addressing the problem of crime and violence.

The problem of crime and violence

Recent studies have shown a dramatic increase in crime and violence in Latin America, particularly in the 1980s. There are significant variations across countries in homicide rates: from 60.8 homicides per 100,000 population in Colombia to 2.9/100,000 in Chile in 1994/95.¹ However, average rates in Latin America are higher than in any other region of the world and have increased from 8 homicides per 100,000 population in the 1970s to 13/100,000 in the 1990s.² In addition to the general problem of violent crime, there has been growing concern in the region with the problem of violence against women and violence against children and adolescents.³

There is significant inequality in the distribution of violence among different social groups and geographical areas in the region. The highest homicide rates are registered among the male population and the age group 20-24 years old. In Colombia, for example, homicide rates for this group reach 249.4/1000,000, compared to 60.8/100,000 for the entire population.⁴ However, there have been significant increases in the homicide rates among the female population and the age groups 15-19 and 10-14 years old in the 1980s and 1990s.⁵

The rise in crime and violence has been particularly acute in the largest cities and metropolitan areas, where homicide rates tend to be significantly higher than in the rest of the country. Homicide rates in the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro reach 55/100,000 and 52/100,000, compared to 23/100,000 in Brazil. They reached 95/100,000 in San Salvador, 101/100,000 in Guatemala City, 112/100,000 in Cali and 248/100,000 in Medellin. ⁶

Furthermore, in the largest cities and metropolitan areas, there are significant differences in the level of crime and violence in the richest and the poorest neighborhoods. Maps of violence in Brazilian cities show significant differences in homicide rates across neighborhoods. Homicide rates varied from 2.65 to 111.52/100,000 in São Paulo (1995), 0.0 to 74.13/100,000 in Curitiba (1993-95), 0.0 to 101.8 in Salvador (1994) and 0.0 to 245.1 in Rio de Janeiro (1996).⁷

A series of factors have contributed to the increase in violent crime in Latin America since the transitions from authoritarianism to democracy.⁸ Conjectural factors and national characteristics aggravated the problem in particular countries. However, some factors have increased the risk of crime and violence in many or most countries in the region in the 1980s and 1990s.

• History of civil wars and armed conflicts
• Persistence of high levels of social inequality
• Low and/or negative rates of economic growth
• High level of unemployment
• Rapid growth of large cities and metropolitan areas
• Absence/weakness of basic urban infrastructure, basic social services and community organizations in the poorest neighborhoods, in the periphery of large cities and metropolitan areas
• Growing availability of arms and drugs
• Growing presence, strengthening of organized crime
• Culture of violence, reinforced by organized crime as well as the media, the police and the private security services
• Low level of effectiveness of the police and other institutions in the criminal justice system

Implications for economic and social development, democratic consolidation and regional integration

The increase in crime and violence has a significant impact on the prospects for economic and social development, democratic consolidation and regional integration. Londoño and Guerreiro have estimated that the costs of violence in Latin America in 1997 (including health losses, material losses, intangibles and transferences) reached 5.1% of GDP in Peru, 11.8% in Venezuela, 12.3% in Mexico, 10.5% in Brazil, 24.7% in Colombia and 24.9% in El Salvador.⁹

The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank have pointed out the high rates of violence as a major obstacle for economic and social development in Latin America.¹⁰ High rates of crime and violence increase the resources needed for crime control and prevention and the resources needed for assisting the victims of violence, reducing therefore the resources available for investments in infrastructure and in economic and social programs. High rates of crime and violence also reduce the incentives for long-term investments (foreign and domestic as well as private and public investments).

Annual growth rates of per capita GDP in Latin Americas was in average 2.0% in the 1990s and -1.7% in the 1980s. From 1950 to 1998, eight countries (Brazil, Costa Rica, Panama, Mexico, Trinidad Tobago, Dominican Republic, Colombia and Ecuador) had average growth rates of per capita GDP of 2.0-2.5%. Seven countries (Chile, Peru, El Salvador, Paraguay) had average growth rates of 1.0-2.0%. Seven countries (Uruguay, Bolivia, Argentina, Guatemala Honduras, Venezuela and Nicaragua) had average growth rates of 0.5-1.0%. Guyana had negative growth rate (-0.5%).

There has been a significant increase in the Human Development Index (HDI) from 0.47 in the 1960s to 0.76 in the 1990s. The gap between Latin America and the developed countries narrowed from the 1960s (HDI 0.47 and 0.79) to the 1990s (HDI 0.76 and 0.92). This increase in HDI reflects advances in the areas of health and education. There was a significant increase in life expectancy at birth (55 years in the 1950s and 71 in the 1990s), due mainly to reductions in infant mortality. There was also a significant increase in the literacy rate of people over 15 (from 72% in the 1960s to 87% in the 1990s). However, progress in health has been hindered by high rates of violent death, due mainly to increases in homicides, and progress in education has been hindered by slow progress in secondary and post-secondary education.¹¹

Democratic Consolidation

High levels of crime, particularly violent crime, the growth of organized crime, the arbitrariness and corruption of public officials undermine the confidence or trust in the rule of law, the police, the criminal justice system and the government.¹² There have been major advances in the protection of civil and political rights since the transition to democracy. However, this progress has benefited high- income more than low-income groups.

Opinion surveys conducted by Latinobarometro show 48% of support for democracy in Latin America (with variations from 25% in El Salvador to 79% in Uruguay) in 2001, compared to 78% in the European Union, 69% in Africa and 53% in Eastern Europe.¹⁴ The same surveys show 25% of satisfaction with democracy in Latin America, compared to 53% in the European Union, 58% in Africa and 29% in Eastern Europe. ¹⁵

In Latin America, support for democracy declined from 62% in the 1997 to 48% in 2001.¹⁶ Satisfaction with democracy declined from 41% in 1997 to 25% in 2001.¹⁷ In the period, support for democracy declined in virtually every country in the region, except Peru. In Mexico, 46% of the population favored democracy in comparison to any other kind of government in 2001, compared to 49% in 1995. In Brazil, preference for democracy declined from 41% in 1995 to 30% in 2001. In El Salvador, it declined from 56% in 1996 to 25% in 2001.¹⁸

There is an on-going debate on the role of the government, the criminal justice system and particularly the police in crime control. One approach emphasizes the importance of law enforcement in crime control and asserts the central importance of the government, the criminal justice system and the police. Another approach emphasizes the importance of demographic, economic, social and cultural factors and asserts the marginal importance the government, the criminal justice system and the police in crime control.¹⁹

Despite the on-going debate, new democratic governments in Latin America facing high rates of crime and high exposure of crime in the media tend to support conservative "zero tolerance" policies for crime control and the strengthening of the government, the criminal justice system and the police. This tendency is particularly strong in electoral periods, due to the belief that economic, social and cultural policies aiming to eliminate the causes of crime may be successful in the long term but cannot solve the problem of crime in the short term. In order not to be seen as soft on crime, even progressive governments are inclined to adopt conservative policies.

The problem is that "zero tolerance" policies increase the risk of police violence and corruption.²⁰ In Latin America, given the history of authoritarianism and the relative weakness of democratic institutions and practices, particularly institutions and practices to ensure the accountability and responsiveness of the police, the risk of police violence and corruption is particularly high.²¹

Actual increases in police violence and corruption have alienated the public and made it more difficult the investigation of crimes, the prosecution of suspects and the punishment of criminals. They have also made it more difficult for the citizens to see the difference between authoritarian and democratic regimes, therefore undermining the legitimacy of new democracies in the region. ²²

Regional Integration

The growth of crime and violence has been an obstacle to democratic consolidation and economic and social development but also to regional integration in the Americas. There has been growing collaboration between the police and the military in the region, in the struggle against organized crime, particularly drug-traffic, and more recently terrorism. However, regional integration depends less on the collaboration between the police and the military than on the opening of borders for economic, social and cultural exchanges.

The collaboration between the police and the military across countries certainly cannot be compared to the collaboration that existed under authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. There is no longer collaboration in the development of techniques for executions, disappearances and torture. However, this collaboration often focus more on the techniques and technologies to assist the police and the military in controlling crime rather than institutions and practices to maintain the police and the military accountable and responsive to the law and the citizens.²³

Furthermore, this collaboration has contributed to strengthen repressive and sometimes brutal strategies to the control of crime, in which criminals tend to be shut out of the society and foreigners, particularly if they belong to minority groups, tend to be shut out of the country. In Latin America, aggressive, zero tolerance police strategies often tend to prevail over community, problem-oriented or quality-of-life styles of policing, contributing to the closing rather than the opening of relationships within and across countries. ²⁴

Addressing the problem: international cooperation

The level of economic and social development, democratic consolidation and regional integration not only suffer the impact but also affect the level of crime and insecurity in Latin America. However, there is a growing recognition of the fact that the level of crime and insecurity in the country is related not only to the structural characteristics of the society, which tend to change slowly, but to the quality, legitimacy and effectiveness of public security policies in each country.

In Latin America, the efforts to address the problem of crime and insecurity combine crime control and crime prevention strategies, but normally emphasize more crime control through deterrence and punishment (particularly incarceration) than crime prevention. Incarceration have been historically the preferred response to crime, even to less serious crimes, reinforced recently by aggressive, zero tolerance policies in the United States. ²⁵

The problem in the region is that, given the relative weakness of democratic institutions and practices, crime control strategies that require the growth of police powers increase the risk of police violence and corruption, undermining the legitimacy and efficacy of the police and the criminal justice system. The majority of the population expresses "no trust" and "little trust" in the police and the Judiciary. The percentage of the population that express "a lot of trust" and "some trust" varied from 30% in 1996 to 36% in 2000 in the case of the police and from 33% in 1996 to 34% in 2000 in the case of the Judiciary.²⁶

In order to minimize this risk, several governments, research centers and civil society organizations have increasingly adopted two strategies. The first one is to invest more in crime prevention, particularly local level crime prevention, and community, problem-oriented or quality-of-life styles of policing. The second strategy is to invest more on the strengthening of democratic institutions and practices, particularly institutions and practices to ensure police accountability and responsiveness to the law and the citizens.

There are many examples of institutions that have developed programs of international collaboration along these lines in the 1990s, including: